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Abstract
An increasing number of companies are striving to reduce their carbon emissions and, as a result, they
provide incentives to their employees linked to the reduction of carbon emissions. Using both fixed
effects models and matching samples we find evidence that the use of monetary incentives is associated
with higher carbon emissions. Moreover, we find that the use of nonmonetary incentives is associated
with lower carbon emissions. Consistent with monetary incentives crowding out motivation for prosocial
behavior, we find that the effect of monetary incentives on carbon emissions is fully eliminated when
these incentives are provided to employees with formally assigned responsibility for environmental
performance. Furthermore, by employing a two-stage multinomial logistic model, we provide insights
into factors affecting companies’ decisions on incentive provision, as well as showing that the impact of
monetary incentives on carbon emissions remains significant after controlling for potential selection bias
in our sample.
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1. Introduction
Climate change is currently a topic of great interest to corporations, investors, policy makers, and
academics. The Stern Review, commissioned by the British Government, estimates the overall costs and
risks of climate change to be equivalent to losing at least 5 percent of global GDP each year (i.e., over $3
trillion for 2010). Because of the role of greenhouse gases, especially carbon emissions, in causing global
warming and the massive consequences that climate change may have on the planet, a plethora of
initiatives seeking to reduce the carbon emissions of both public and private organizations have emerged
around the world. Accordingly, many corporations are introducing incentives to their employees for
reducing carbon emissions resulting from the firm’s operations. Typically, such incentives fall within two
broad categories: they can be either monetary (e.g., cash bonuses) or nonmonetary (e.g., public
recognition, usually in the form of awards). In this paper, we investigate how effective such incentives are
in reducing carbon emissions for the firms that provide them and contribute to a literature in managerial
accounting that examines the choice and consequences of incentive contracts (Bushman, Indjejikian and
Smith, 1995; Banker, Potter and Srinivasan, 2000).
A number of organizations have voluntarily and unilaterally adopted corporate policies that
require reduction of the carbon emissions generated through their operations or their supply chains.
Accordingly, employees may regard such policies as prosocial behavior (Benabou and Tirole, 2006)
provided that the underlying reasoning for reducing carbon emissions is not the maximization of private
gains but, rather, the contribution to the public good. However, many argue that companies voluntarily
reduce carbon emissions because it is in fact consistent with profit maximization: for example, greater
energy efficiency reduces costs and reduces carbon emissions at the same time. Furthermore, mounting
social awareness with regards to the detrimental effects of climate change and the real possibility of
regulatory and legislative actions provide additional reasons for companies to voluntarily limit their
carbon emissions. It is argued therefore, that voluntary reduction of carbon emissions, even if it entails
some short-term costs due to the required upfront investment, may potentially create a basis for a
competitive advantage in the long-term.
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Provided that a firm decides to reduce its carbon emissions, it has to effectively motivate its
employees to engage in actions and behaviors to achieve a reduction in carbon emissions. Consequently,
understanding why employees would exert effort to reduce carbon emissions can have significant
implications for the optimal design of incentive contracts. On the one hand, if employees act to reduce
carbon emissions because they believe that they contribute to the public good, then providing monetary
incentives might crowd out intrinsic or reputational motivation and eventually lead to higher emissions.
On the other hand, if employees exert effort to reduce carbon emissions because they believe that it
maximizes the long-term profitability of the firm, and hence their own share of such economic benefits,
then monetary incentives will be relatively more effective at motivating employees.
In this paper, we provide the first set of empirical evidence on the effectiveness of monetary
versus nonmonetary incentives in reducing carbon emissions. Using panel data for a sample of firms
across the world, we find that firms that provide monetary incentives have higher carbon emissions
compared to firms that provide no incentives. In contrast, we find that firms that provide nonmonetary
incentives have lower carbon emissions compared to firms that provide no incentives. Our findings
remain after we control for other established determinants of carbon emission levels, including the scale
of the firm’s operations, the adoption of corporate policies to reduce carbon emissions, the existence of
commercial opportunities and risks from climate change, and the quality of sustainability governance.
Moreover, we control for industry, country, and year fixed effects or for industry and country timevarying effects.
In subsequent analysis, our results hold when we restrict the sample to companies with at least
three observations and include firm fixed effects. This result suggests that correlated unobservable timeinvariant firm characteristics are unlikely to explain our findings. Moreover, we perform a matching
analysis whereby we track the evolution of carbon emission intensity over time for a group of firms that
switch from providing no incentives to providing monetary incentives (treatment group) against a group
of matched firms that do not provide any incentives linked to carbon emissions across the time period we
study (control group). We find that the treatment group experiences an increase in carbon emission
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intensity (i.e. carbon emissions over sales) following the introduction of monetary incentives relative to
the control group. This analysis further increases our confidence in the results by indicating that reverse
causality is unlikely to be an alternative explanation of the documented association between carbon
emissions and the provision of monetary incentives.1
Importantly, we further parse this question by varying the degree to which employees regard
commitments to reduce carbon emissions as prosocial behavior. We posit that employees whose job
descriptions explicitly include the formal responsibility for environmental performance and emissions
reduction will be less likely to consider such goals as prosocial behavior. This would occur because the
job responsibilities of these employees are based on an explicit and direct economic rationale for reducing
carbon emissions.2 Consistent with this argument, we find that the negative effect of monetary incentives
on reducing carbon emissions is fully mitigated when these incentives are provided to employees with
direct responsibility for environmental performance.
Finally, we implement a two-stage multinomial logistic model to explicitly account in the first
stage for a number of factors that could drive the probability of a firm adopting a particular incentive
scheme linked to carbon emission reduction. Specifically, we model the adoption of incentive schemes as
a function of economic, institutional, and ethical motives (Aguilera et al. 2007; Bansal and Roth, 2000;
Bronn and Vidaver-Cohen, 2009; Massa, 2012). The results of this analysis are consistent with our main
findings: we find directionally consistent results for the association between monetary or nonmonetary
incentives and carbon emissions.
This study contributes to the literature that explores the relative effectiveness of monetary versus
nonmonetary incentives for improving task performance, especially when efforts are likely to be regarded
1

Reverse causality is unlikely to be an alternative explanation for the documented negative association between
carbon emissions and the provision of nonmonetary incentives, since it is difficult to argue why firms with lower
carbon emissions would provide nonmonetary incentives instead of no incentives at all.
2
Somebody could argue that people who self-select or are selected into positions with environmental performance
responsibilities are more intrinsically motivated to perform prosocial tasks and that monetary incentives would have
negative effects on their task performance. That may well be true. However, compared to those in the firm who are
not in such positions, they will still be more likely to treat reducing carbon emissions as part of their formal job
responsibility and less likely to treat it as pure prosocial behaviors. And that’s the comparison we focus on in our
analysis.
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as prosocial behavior. First, by providing empirical evidence on such a critical issue as carbon emissions,
we contribute to the debate on whether monetary incentives are effective in motivating particular and
desired individual behaviors. Gibbons (1998) suggests that management practices based on economic
models may dampen non-economic realities such as motivation and social relations, and that empirical
data would be useful in deepening our understanding of this issue. On the one hand, there are several
studies documenting what is broadly known as a ‘crowding-out’ effect - the negative effects of monetary
incentives on effort. That is, monetary incentives can crowd out intrinsic motivation or reputational
motivation for agents engaging in a given task and, therefore, they result in the worsening of task
performance. On the other hand, Prendergast (1999) notes that there is little conclusive empirical
evidence documenting that monetary incentives could crowd-out motivation and lead to worse
performance in workplace settings. Therefore, whether and under what conditions the negative effects of
monetary incentives emerge in a real workplace setting, remain open questions. Our analysis provides
empirical evidence that for tasks entailing prosocial elements, monetary incentives may be ineffective at
motivating behavior unless they are provided to people for whom such tasks constitute part of their formal
job responsibility; otherwise, nonmonetary incentives are likely to be more effective.
In addition, we contribute to the accounting literature that explores how the task type and the type
of incentive scheme affect the efficacy of monetary incentives and may influence the design of
management accounting and control systems. In reviewing numerous laboratory-based studies in this
literature, Bonner et al. (2000) find that monetary incentives improve performance in only about half of
the experiments and argue that as tasks become more cognitively complex monetary incentives become
less effective. Complementing this line of work, our study posits that an additional task characteristic, its
prosocial nature, significantly impacts the effectiveness of different types of incentives and should also be
considered in the design of accounting and control systems.
As in any non-laboratory analysis where the treatment effect is non-randomly applied, it is
challenging to identify a direct causal effect. While it is conceivable that an unobservable factor exists
that is positively correlated with monetary incentives, negatively correlated with nonmonetary incentives,
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and positively correlated with carbon emissions, we have not been able to identify such a factor. An
alternative explanation is that reverse causality (i.e., firms that provide monetary incentives have higher
carbon emissions) is generating our findings. The analysis where we introduce firm fixed-effects partially
addresses this concern and suggests that when holding the firm constant, after the introduction of
monetary incentives carbon emissions actually increase (i.e. within firm variation). Moreover, the twostage multinomial logistic model that we present yields results consistent with our initial analyses and
suggests that selection bias alone cannot explain our results. Importantly, we note that the documented
ineffectiveness of monetary incentives is conditional on the power of these incentives. It is quite possible
that if a company increases the power of its monetary incentives (i.e., larger monetary payouts) then they
might eventually lead to lower carbon emissions.
The remaining of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the motivation for this study
and presents the literature review. Section 3 presents the sample and summary statistics. Section 4
discusses the results from the analyses. Finally, section 5 concludes and discusses caveats that apply to
this paper.
2. Motivation and Literature Review
Carbon emissions can be thought of as a classic case of an externality. Organizations that emit large
amounts of carbon increase the probability of future adverse environmental events that may negatively
affect numerous other organizations, investors, and society as a whole. Moreover, organizations do not
internalize all the costs associated with carbon emissions since companies with high carbon emissions
might not be directly adversely affected themselves by climate change (for example, due to their
geographic location and due to the absence of a global carbon tax). Because no one firm bears directly the
costs of its negative externality, coupled with the lack of Pigovian taxation, firms emit more carbon than
is socially optimal. 3
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In the presence of negative externalities, the social cost of a market activity is not covered by the private cost of the
activity, which could lead to an inefficient market and over-consumption of the product or resource. A Pigovian tax
equal to the negative externality is thought to correct the market outcome back to efficiency.
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Because of the public good nature of carbon emissions, civil society organizations, such as the
Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP)4 and Ceres5, have been active in increasing awareness about the effects
of climate change and mobilizing stakeholders in efforts to reduce carbon emissions. Moreover, within
organizations numerous employee initiatives are currently underway to reduce carbon emissions through
reductions in energy consumption, reductions in travel, switching the type of energy used, influencing
customer behavior, and in various other ways. In many cases, these grassroots movements were
complemented by or evolved into enterprise-wide initiatives and they tend to be institutionalized within
organizations under the supervision of a Corporate Sustainability Officer (CSO) or someone with a
similar title. The fact that, in many cases, employees voluntarily exert efforts to reduce carbon emissions,
suggests that to a certain extent these efforts are guided by employees’ determination to contribute
towards the public good by decreasing negative externalities imposed by their organization on society.
Therefore, it is very likely that internal efforts to reduce carbon emissions can be classified as prosocial
behavior.
However, the issue of climate change is becoming an increasingly important economic issue for
companies due to several reasons. First, current and future expected regulations around the world aim to
limit the carbon emissions of corporations by either imposing a direct Pigovian tax or by instituting capand-trade programs. In the former case, a firm pays a certain price for every ton of carbon emissions it
generates through its operations. In the latter case, corporations are allowed to emit carbon up to a certain
amount and if they exceed that amount then they need to buy carbon emission allowances in the
marketplace. Correspondingly, if they emit less, they can sell their residual allowances. Both mechanisms
increase a firm’s operating costs in proportion to the amount of carbon emissions. Moreover, rapidly
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The Carbon Disclosure Project is an NGO based in the United Kingdom that works with more then 3,000 of the
world’s largest corporations to help them disclose their greenhouse gas emissions but also to help them ensure that
an effective carbon emissions reduction policy is integral to their strategy and business model.
5
Ceres is a non-profit organization based in Boston, Massachusetts that advocates for sustainability leadership.
Accordingly, it “mobilizes a network of investors, companies and public interest groups to accelerate and expand the
adoption of sustainable business practices and solutions to build a healthy global economy”. Ceres also launched the
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) that has since become the de facto international standard for voluntary corporate
reporting on environmental, social and economic performance.
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shifting social expectations regarding the environmental performance of corporations provide another
economic rationale for reducing carbon emissions: good environmental performance, including but not
limited to lower carbon emissions, may be rewarded in the product, labor, and capital markets. Since
customers, employees, and investors increasingly demand that companies take measures to address
climate change, firms with better environmental performance have more loyal and satisfied customers
who want to buy ‘greener’ products (Bhattacharya and Sen 2004), more engaged and satisfied employees
who want to work for a ‘greener’ employer (Turban and Greening 1996), and face lower capital
constraints since investors are building future carbon prices into their valuation decisions (Cheng,
Ioannou, and Serafeim 2012). All these reasons suggest that employees may perceive efforts to reduce
carbon emissions primarily as an economic imperative that would increase sales or reduce operating
costs.
Therefore, ex ante it is not clear the extent to which employees are motivated to reduce carbon
emissions for prosocial or for economic reasons. However, the underlying motivation is a key determinant
of the relative effectiveness of monetary versus nonmonetary incentives. Benabou and Tirole (2006)
develop a theory according to which the individual’s behavior reflects an endogenous and unobservable
mix of three types of motivation: intrinsic, extrinsic, and reputational. Intrinsic motivation is the innate
satisfaction accruing to the individual regardless of perceptions by others. Reputational motivation is the
satisfaction accruing to the individual from positive perceptions others have of her. Benabou and Tirole
(2006) also show that the presence of monetary incentives diminishes the reputational value associated
with performing good deeds (i.e., prosocial behavior) by creating doubt regarding the extent to which
such deeds were performed in order to contribute to the public good or because of the monetary
incentives themselves. Monetary incentives act like an increase in the noise-to-signal ratio, or even
reverse the sign of the signal, with the associated crowding out of the reputational motivation making
aggregate supply of effort downward sloping. This is in line with what psychologists term as the ‘over
justification effect’ (Lepper et al., 1973). Furthermore, in their model nonmonetary incentives, such as
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public recognition during award ceremonies, strengthen the signaling motive and encourage prosocial
behavior.
A number of experimental as well as archival studies have produced results that are consistent
with the idea of monetary incentives crowding out prosocial behavior. For example, Gneezy and
Rustichini (2000a) conduct an experiment with Israeli day care providers and find that when they institute
a fine for parents picking their children up late, late pickups in fact increase. Essentially, the fine is seen
as a fee, an economic incentive, which parents could decide to pay and assuage any moral resistance to
noncompliance. Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) find that monetary incentives decrease the acceptance
rate among citizens of a local community on whether a nuclear waste repository should be located in their
town. Kunreuther et al. (1990) find similar results for the siting of a nuclear repository in Nevada, where
raising tax rebates failed to increase support for the project since they signaled the opposite of prosocial
behavior. Moreover, research has also shown that nonmonetary incentives such as public recognition or
peer pressure can strengthen reputational motivation and lead individuals to contribute more to public
goods. For example, Potters et al. (2007) show the effect of charities’ frequent strategy of publicly
announcing ‘leadership’ contributions and the higher yields achieved when donors act sequentially rather
than simultaneously.
However, agency theory studies the effect of monetary incentives on individual performance, and
argues that monetary incentives are used to align the principal’s objectives with those of the agent’s.
Empirical research on the effect of such monetary incentive contracts (i.e., pay-for-performance
contracts) finds that individuals respond to monetary incentives either by working harder or by selfselecting into those pay-for-performance jobs that best match their own ability level (Lazear, 2000). In
psychology, the behavioral school also argues that monetary incentives have a positive effect on
motivation by providing positive reinforcement, which in turn increases the frequency of the rewarded
behaviors and results in enhanced performance (Skinner, 1953).
These studies that have explored the effectiveness of monetary versus nonmonetary incentives
have been conducted at the level of the individual and examined the effect of such incentives on
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individual performance. The overall empirical and experimental evidence seem to point to mixed effects
of monetary incentives contingent on the nature of the tasks involved. The general lessons that can be
drawn from this body of research are that monetary (nonmonetary) incentives tend to be less (more)
effective when tasks are perceived as being motivated by public good concerns. Therefore, whether
monetary (nonmonetary) incentives would be more or less effective in reducing carbon emissions is an
important open question that warrants empirical investigation.
In contrast to previous work, we conduct our analysis at the firm- rather than the individual-level
of analysis, by investigating the effectiveness of monetary versus nonmonetary incentives on reducing
carbon emissions. Provided that there are no theories linking incentives and prosocial behavior at the firm
level, our working assumption is that firm-level data represent an aggregation of individual-level data.
Accordingly, we have no a priori predictions on the effectiveness of monetary versus nonmonetary
incentives since we have no a priori knowledge about the distribution of motivation at the individual
level within firms regarding whether the reduction of carbon emissions is seen as prosocial behavior or
not. However, we hypothesize that monetary incentives are less effective in reducing carbon emissions
when firms provide such monetary incentives to employees who are more likely to regard the reduction of
carbon emissions as a prosocial activity.
3. Sample and Summary Statistics
We obtain information on firms’ incentive structures regarding climate change management through the
investor survey of the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP). The investor CDP survey requests information
on the risks and opportunities of climate change from the world’s largest companies (by market
capitalization) on behalf of institutional investor signatories (in 2011, there were a total of 551
institutional investor signatories with a combined $71 trillion in assets under management). The main
goals of this survey are to provide investors with the necessary tools and information to assess the firm’s
climate risk, as well as to help firms develop the ability to generate and provide comparable and relevant
climate data to their shareholders. In the 2010 questionnaire, respondents included 84 percent of the
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European 300, 82 percent of the Global 500, 70 percent of the S&P 500, and 74 percent of the largest 100
South African companies. See Appendix I for a complete list of sample compositions around the world.6
Starting in 2007, the investor CDP survey asks questions about whether firms provide incentives
to manage climate change goals (e.g., carbon emission reduction targets). Respondents could answer
‘Yes’ or ‘No’ to this question. The CDP survey also asks a question on what types of incentives are
provided for managing such goals.7 In the majority of cases, respondents to the survey hold positions in
the sustainability department and they are typically supervised by the CSO of the firm. Moreover, these
questions ask about the existence of incentives in the firm instead of asking about the actual ex-post
incentive payout. These annual investor CDP surveys, to the best of our knowledge, are the first to
provide direct, large-scale, cross-sectional data on the types of incentives provided by firms for a specific
environmental performance dimension. The survey questions are designed to solicit answers on the
existence of a particular management practice (e.g., yes/no answers), as opposed to answers based on
cognitive or affective assessment. Therefore, these questions are appropriate and useful for generating
objective answers and are also less subject to certain biases of survey studies, such as scaling effects.8
We merge the data from all the responses in investor CDP surveys (2007 to 2010) with the
Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database that provides information on firms’ carbon emissions, sustainability
governance structure, and the adoption of climate management policies.9 We measure carbon emissions
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According to the survey administrators at CDP, the survey answers were by majority submitted by people within
each company whose title contains the word ‘sustainability’ or ‘environment.’
7
Before 2010, this question was open-ended, i.e. respondents could provide a description of their company’s
incentive programs related to managing carbon emission goals. We carefully read these descriptions and coded the
types of incentives provided by a company as monetary, non-monetary, or both. In 2010 and 2011, standard options
(monetary reward, recognition, prizes, and other non-monetary rewards) were offered for this question, which made
our coding of incentive types as monetary or non-monetary easier. See Appendix II for a sample of answers from
survey respondents.
8
Scale design and anchor choice will influence respondents’ ratings, making it difficult to make comparisons across
respondents.
9
ASSET4 was a privately held Swiss-based firm (acquired by Thomson Reuters in 2009). The firm collects data and
scores firms on environmental and social dimensions since 2002. Research analysts of ASSET4 collect more than
900 evaluation points per firm, where all the primary data used must be objective and publically available.
Subsequently, these 900 evaluation points are used as inputs to a default equal-weighted framework to calculate 250
key performance indicators (KPIs) that they further organize into 18 categories within 3 pillars: a) environmental
performance score, b) social performance score and c) corporate governance score. Every year, a firm receives a zscore for each of the pillars, benchmarking its performance with the rest of the firms in the database.
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as the sum of Scope 1 and Scope 2 carbon emissions. Scope 1 emissions are direct emissions from
sources that are owned or controlled by the reporting entity. Scope 2 emissions are indirect emissions
from consumption of purchased electricity, heat or steam. Scope 3 are other indirect emissions, such as
the extraction and production of purchased materials and fuels, transport-related activities in vehicles not
owned or controlled by the reporting entity, electricity-related activities not covered in Scope 2,
outsourced activities, waste disposal, and so forth. We exclude Scope 3 carbon emissions because most
companies do not disclose them. Moreover, Scope 3 emissions take place outside the boundaries of the
organization and as a result they cannot be directly affected by employee efforts and therefore, they are
less likely to be affected by the provision of incentives. After merging the two datasets, we have a final
sample size of 1,683 firm-year observations (794 unique firms).
Table 1 shows the summary statistics and variable definitions for this sample. We use the natural
logarithm of carbon emissions and the natural logarithm of carbon emissions scaled by sales (carbon
emission intensity) as the dependent variables. The independent variables of interest are a pair of indicator
variables indicating whether the focal firm provides monetary or nonmonetary incentives that are directly
linked to reduction of carbon emissions. Monetary incentives account for 42.1 percent of the firm-years,
while 18.5 percent of the firm-years are associated with nonmonetary incentives. The vast majority of
nonmonetary incentives come in the form of public recognition at company award ceremonies. The
second most frequent type of nonmonetary incentives is associated with a small amount of money that a
company gives to the winners to give to a charity of their choice, or to a pre-specified charity. The
average size of the firms in our sample (as measured by sales, employees, or assets) is relatively large due
to the inclusion criterion (i.e., largest firms by market capitalization) in the investor CDP survey. On
average, the firms in the sample have $8.6 billion in sales, 21 thousand employees, and $16 billion in
assets. Moreover, 60, 70, and 72 percent of the firm-years have corporate policies to reduce carbon
emissions, transportation emissions, and supply chain emissions, respectively. Also, 70 percent of the
firm-years are associated with the presence of a board committee responsible for sustainability and 65
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percent identify commercial risks and opportunities from climate change. Finally, 47 percent provide an
audit opinion on their sustainability disclosures.
Table 2 presents the correlation matrix for the variables included in our analysis. Monetary
incentives are positively correlated with carbon emission intensity, while nonmonetary incentives are
negatively correlated with carbon emission intensity. The majority of the control variables (those not
related to size) are positively correlated with carbon emissions, raising the possibility that these variables
and the use of monetary incentives may be driven by the same underlying economic and technological
factors. We use these variables to capture and control for these potentially unobservable factors when
estimating the effect of monetary and nonmonetary incentives on firms’ environmental performance.
4. Results
Baseline Analysis
We first estimate the association between the adoption of incentives and carbon emissions by employing
ordinary least squares (OLS) models that control for year, industry, and country fixed effects. The model
in Table 3 column (1) is therefore:
(1) Carbon emissionsi,t = α0 + α1 Salesi,t + β1Monetaryi,t + β2 Nonmonetaryi,t + Country Fixed
Effects + Industry Fixed Effects + Year Fixed Effects
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of carbon emissions. Furthermore, we include a
control for the scale of operations since the level of emissions is closely linked to the size of a firm’s
operations; we use the natural logarithm of sales to proxy for size. The independent variables of interest
are two indicator variables that characterize whether a firm provides monetary or nonmonetary incentives
to its employees. Table 3 column (1) shows the estimated coefficients and their statistical significance.
The model in column (1) explains 83.3 percent of the variation in the natural logarithm of carbon
emissions. The coefficient on Monetary is positive and significant (0.215, t=3.08). In contrast, the
coefficient on Nonmonetary is negative and marginally significant (-0.141, t=-1.76). The coefficient on
sales, which can be interpreted as an elasticity measure, is close to one suggesting that a one percent
increase in sales is associated with a one percent increase in carbon emissions.
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A plausible explanation for the documented association between monetary incentives and the
level of carbon emissions is that both are correlated with an unobserved third factor. For example, firms
that make a clear commitment towards reducing their carbon footprint based on a solid business case will
be more likely to provide monetary incentives but may also have higher carbon emissions. The model in
Table 3 column (2) addresses this alternative explanation by including control variables that are likely to
contribute to carbon emissions as well as affect the company’s incentive policies.
(2) Carbon emissionsi,t = α0 + α1 Salesi,t + β1Monetaryi,t + β2 Nonmonetaryi,t + γ1 Corporate
Policiesi,t + γ2 Business Case for Climate Change Actioni,t + γ3 Sustainability Governancei,t +
Country Fixed Effects + Industry Fixed Effects + Year Fixed Effects
Specifically, we include controls for the adoption of Corporate Policies aimed at reducing carbon
emissions, transportation and supply chain emissions, because such corporate policies would have a direct
effect on a firm’s carbon emission level and also correlate with a firm’s decision to provide incentives for
the reduction of carbon emissions. Moreover, we include a control variable for firms that discuss in their
annual or sustainability report the commercial opportunities and risks caused by climate change. This is
because such firms explicitly base their decisions on the business case for undertaking climate change
actions, and are thus more likely to be affected by factors within their industry that both impact their
carbon emissions and their incentive provisions on carbon emissions. Also, to capture the relevant
component of a firm’s governance structure, we include controls for its commitment towards
sustainability: the presence of a board committee for sustainability and a control for whether the firm
undertakes an audit of its sustainability report.
Table 3 column (2) shows that the coefficients on Monetary and Nonmonetary remain positive
and negative, respectively. Both are significant but the magnitude of the coefficient for monetary
incentives somewhat decreases, suggesting that this alternative explanation partly drives the association
between Monetary and Emissions in column (1). All else equal, firms that provide monetary incentives
have 17.8 percent higher emissions and firms that provide nonmonetary incentives have 14.6 percent
lower emissions compared to firms that provide no carbon emissions incentives. From the added control
14

variables, the most significant coefficients are on the variables on corporate policy to reduce carbon
emissions and on sustainability audit. As expected, both coefficients are positive and significant. The
model now explains 84 percent of the variation in carbon emissions.
Another potential explanation for the association between incentives and emissions is that we
have imperfectly controlled for the scale of the firm’s operations. To address this concern we include
additional controls including the natural logarithm of the company’s total assets and the natural logarithm
of the number of employees.
(3) Carbon emissionsi,t = α0 + α1 Salesi,t + α2 Employeesi,t + α3 Assetsi,t + β1Monetaryi,t + β2
NonMonetaryi,t + γ1 Corporate Policiesi,t + γ2 Business Case for Climate Change Actioni,t + γ3
Sustainability Governancei,t + Country Fixed Effects + Industry Fixed Effects + Year Fixed
Effects
Column (3) shows that the results do not change significantly. Because we are missing data on
Employees for some companies, the number of observations drops to 1,602. All three scale variables load
with a positive and significant coefficient, as expected. However, the additional scale variables do not add
much to the explanatory power of the model, suggesting that sales as a scale variable is probably
sufficient. The model now explains 85.7 percent of the variation in carbon emissions. Moreover, the
coefficients on the incentives’ variables remain almost identical, although their statistical significance
slightly increases. Table 3, column (3) shows that the coefficient on Monetary is positive and significant
(0.178, t=2.87) while the coefficient on Nonmonetary is negative and significant (-0.142, t=-1.93).
Table 4 presents several estimations that test the robustness of the results documented in Table 3.
Column (1) uses as the dependent variable the intensity measure (i.e., the natural logarithm of carbon
emissions over sales), a measure that is more closely used as a target for carbon emissions reductions, and
as a result no scale variables are included as controls. Including scale variables does not change our
results and, in any case, they remain statistically insignificant when included.

The coefficient on

Monetary is positive and significant (0.169, t=2.59) while the coefficient on Nonmonetary is negative and
significant (-0.154, t=-1.99).
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An additional concern is that we have inadequately controlled for industry membership by
including 64 indicator variables; a more fine classification might be necessary. Because most of the
variation in carbon emissions across companies is driven by industry membership, controlling precisely
for industry membership is important. In column (2) of Table 4 we use an alternative industry
classification scheme that generates instead 104 indicator variables. Both coefficients of interest remain
significant. The coefficient on Monetary is positive and significant (0.131, t=1.99), while the coefficient
on Nonmonetary is negative and significant (-0.136, t= -1.97). We do note, though, that increasing the
fineness of the industry classification dramatically reduces the number of firms within each industry,
effectively introducing firm fixed effects for some firms in the sample and hence decreasing the power of
our tests.
A similar concern is that fixed effects are inadequately controlling for systematic shifts at the
country or/and industry level in emission activity. To control for this effect, we introduce 130 timevarying country and 281 time-varying industry effects. A disadvantage of this approach is that
introducing such a large number of indicator variables reduces the power of the statistical test because it
effectively introduces firm fixed effects for some firms in the sample. Column (3) shows that the
coefficient on Monetary remains positive and significant. The coefficient on Nonmonetary remains
negative, though it becomes insignificant.
Firm Fixed Effects Model and Matching Analysis
In Table 5 we introduce firm fixed effects in the specification to isolate any time-invariant, firm-specific
factors that might be creating a spurious correlation between the independent variables of interest and the
dependent variable. For example, we do not directly observe a firm’s overall compensation structure
which could both impact a firm’s adoption of incentives in reducing carbon emissions and the level of
carbon emissions. Introducing firm fixed effects could control for firms’ overall compensation structure to
the extent that such structure is time-invariant during the sample period.
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(4) Carbon emissionsi,t = α0 + α1 Salesi,t + β1Monetaryi,t + β2 NonMonetaryi,t + γ1 Corporate
Policiesi,t + γ2 Business Case for Climate Change Actioni,t + γ3 Sustainability Governancei,t +
Firm Fixed Effects + Country-year Fixed Effects + Industry-year Fixed Effects
The disadvantage of this approach is that the statistical power is significantly impaired because
we do not have data for a long time-series available for each firm. We estimate this model using only 906
observations for 275 firms that individually have at least three observations. In column (1) of Table 5 the
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of emissions while in column (2) it is the natural logarithm of
emissions over sales. The results from these models are similar to the results of Tables 3 and 4 but, as
expected, they are statistically weaker. Column (1) suggests that firms that provide monetary incentives
have 7.1 percent higher emissions and firms that provide nonmonetary incentives have 9.9 percent lower
emissions compared to firms that provide no incentives. Column (2) suggests that firms that provide
monetary incentives have 11.3 percent higher emissions and firms that provide nonmonetary incentives
have 12.8 percent lower emissions compared to firms that provide no incentives. None of the control
variables load with a significant coefficient. The explanatory power of the models increase to 97-98
percent, suggesting that a combination of firm, industry time-variant and country time-variant effects
explain an almost exhaustive percentage of the variation in emissions. These findings increase our
confidence in arguing that it is incentives that lead to the change in emissions rather than other factors.
It is worth noting that the size of the coefficient on nonmonetary incentives is robust across the
different specifications. Its statistical significance, not surprisingly, varies as we introduce additional
control variables, thereby changing the power of the test. Moreover, it is hard to imagine how reverse
causality would be a concern for this type of incentives. We see no plausible reason that would explain
why firms that have abnormally low carbon emissions would provide nonmonetary incentives to their
employees. These additional observations increase our confidence that nonmonetary incentives are likely
to be more effective in motivating employees to reduce carbon emissions.
Establishing the causal effect of monetary incentives is more problematic since reverse causality
is a much more legitimate concern: firms that emit more might be more likely to provide monetary
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incentives. We have tried to address this concern by the introduction of control variables that force
estimation of the coefficients within fine classifications of an industry or even within a firm across time.
To provide further evidence about whether there is a causal effect from monetary incentives to carbon
emissions rather than the other way around, we conduct a matched-sample analysis. There are 103 units
(firm-years) that switched from no incentive to monetary incentives only from year t-1 to year t. 10 We
label this group as the ‘treatment group.’ There are also 401 units providing no incentives in both year t-1
and year t, which we label as the ‘control group.’11
We first take all the units in the treatment group, and match each unit with two units in the control
group that have: 1) exactly the same industry membership and 2) the closest value in carbon emissions
scaled by sales in year t-1. We choose two matching units for each treatment unit to increase the power of
the matching analysis and to exploit information about the evolution of emission intensity in the control
group.12 Since some of the treatment units only match to one control unit that meets the above matching
criteria, we adjust the weight of such units to make every treatment unit carry the same weight in our
calculation of the treatment effect. Then we measure emissions over sales in years t and t+1 to examine
whether the treatment group that starts providing monetary incentives experiences an increase in
emissions relative to the control group. Panel A of Table 6 shows the difference between treatment and
control group for 185 pairs in years t-1 and t.13 The matching procedure appears to be working effectively
since there is no statistical difference in emissions between the treatment and control group in year t-1. In
contrast, emissions are actually higher for the treatment group in year t. The differences-in-differences
10

We have excluded the firms that changed their incentive provision back and forth, i.e. switching from ‘no
incentive’ to ‘monetary incentive’ and then back to ‘no incentive’. These firms represent less than 2 percent of the
initial sample. The reason for switching their incentive provision back and forth is unclear and discussions with
company executives revealed that companies are unlikely to switch their incentive structure back and forth leading
us to believe that these data points are likely coding or response errors.
11
Among the 103 (401) units in the treatment (control) group, 2 (6) units miss emissions variables for year t-1; 4
(11) units miss emission variables for year t; and 63 (204) units miss emission variables for year t+1. These missing
variables would further reduce the final matched sample size.
12
As Abadie and Imbens (2006) show, matching estimators are generally not efficient and to reach efficiency one
would need to increase the number of matches with the sample size. They further point out that there are minimal
efficiency gains by increasing the number of matches for each treatment unit beyond two.
13
A one-to-two match would ideally yield a matched sample size of 206 pairs. However, due to missing values
described in footnote 7 and the fact that some treatment units only find one control unit that meets the criteria, the
final matched sample size comprises 185 pairs.
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estimate is 0.122 and significant at the 5 percent level. The results remain statistically significant when we
consider emissions at year t+1 (Panel B).14
Interaction Effects between Incentive Types and the Perceived Task Nature
As discussed in section 2, reduction of carbon emissions may be regarded as prosocial behavior. Our
findings are consistent with this idea by suggesting that monetary incentives might not only be ineffective
but also detrimental in terms of task performance. In other words, monetary incentives may well crowd
out intrinsic and reputational motivation for reducing carbon emissions. To provide more direct evidence
of this mechanism, we generate interaction terms between the type of incentives provided and the type of
formal position that the incentivized employee occupies. In this respect, we argue that for employees
whose job description specifically and formally includes environmental responsibilities, it would be less
likely that monetary incentives will crowd out prosocial behavior (in contrast to senior executives, board
members, geographic subsidiaries, or business unit managers, i.e. those who are not in positions with
specific and formal environmental performance responsibilities). Exactly because of the nature of the
position and the formally assigned responsibility, tasks or actions related to the environment would be
considered as part of the contractual arrangement between the firm and the focal employee and, therefore,
they would be perceived as legitimate for economically-instrumental reasons and not regarded as
prosocial behavior. In other words, the effect of monetary incentives on carbon emissions is likely to be
mitigated when these incentives are given to employees with formally assigned responsibility for
environmental performance. The model used for this test is:
(5) Carbon emissionsi,t = α0 + α1 Salesi,t + β1Monetaryi,t + β2 Nonmonetaryi,t + β3 Environmental
Positioni,t + β4 Monetaryi,t * Environmental Positioni,t + β5 Nonmonetaryi,t * Environmental
Positioni,t + γ1 Corporate Policiesi,t + γ2 Business Case for Climate Change Actioni,t + γ3

14

One potential explanation for the results is that firms in the treatment group may have had a more positive trend in
the carbon emission level than firms in the control group. During our sample period, there is no obvious difference
in preexisting trends (before year t-1) between the treatment and the control group. In fact, the results still hold if we
match on the closest values in carbon emissions scaled by sales for more previous years (both for years t-1 and t-2).

19

Sustainability Governancei,t + Country Fixed Effects + Industry Fixed Effects + Year Fixed
Effects
‘Environmental Position’ is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm provides incentives to
employees in positions formally responsible for environmental performance. In our sample, 27 percent of
the total observations (i.e., across incentive types) and 55 percent of those providing monetary incentives
offer these incentives to employees in roles and positions formally responsible for environmental
performance. The results in Table 7 support our prediction. The coefficient on the interaction term
between Monetary incentives and Environmental Position is negative and significant when the dependent
variable is the natural logarithm of carbon emissions (-0.393, t=-2.78) or the natural logarithm of carbon
emissions over sales (-0.385, t=-2.74). Moreover, for firms that provide monetary incentives to employees
in ‘Environmental Positions’ we find that the net effect of monetary incentives on carbon emissions is a
decrease by approximately 11 percent that is significant at the 10 percent level of statistical significance.
Two-stage Multinomial Logistic Model
Up to this point, we have discussed and empirically documented a statistically significant relationship
between both monetary (negative association) and nonmonetary (positive association) incentives and
carbon emissions. Yet there is clearly an underlying selection issue: not all firms choose to provide
incentives that are linked to carbon emissions. The existing literature exploring the antecedents to
prosocial behavior (e.g. Bansal and Roth, 2000; Aguilera et al., 2007; Sharma and Starik, 2002) argues
that firms undertake socially responsible activities, such as the reduction of carbon emissions, because of:
a) potentially profitable economic opportunities, b) legitimacy seeking activities, and institutional
pressures and c) ethical concerns. Accordingly, such motives may be classified in three distinct
categories: economic, institutional, and ethical motives (Aguilera et al., 2007; Bansal and Roth, 2000;
Bronn and Vidaver-Cohen, 2009; Massa, 2012).
We therefore argue that the adoption or not of an incentive scheme that aims to reduce carbon
emissions will also be driven by the focal firm’s motives and we therefore propose a first-stage
multinomial logistic specification, modeling four distinct choices: a) no adoption (of any incentive
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scheme), b) adoption of nonmonetary incentives only, c) adoption of monetary incentives only and d)
adoption of both monetary and nonmonetary incentives.
First stage model: Probability (Incentive typei,t) = α0 + α1 Economic Motivesit + α2 Reputational Motiveit
+ α3 Ethical Motivesit
‘Incentive Type’ is a firm’s actual choice from the aforementioned four choices. ‘Economic
(Institutional or Ethical) Motives’ represent variables that proxy for a firm’s tendency to adopt incentive
plans to reduce carbon emissions due to economic (institutional or ethical) motives. For all categories, we
include several variables in order to capture as comprehensively as possible the three categories of
motives discussed above. In particular, firms that are larger (Sales) may be more likely to adopt an
incentive scheme since due to their scale of operations they are better positioned to realize net efficiency
gains or cost reductions linked to reducing carbon emissions (i.e., more likely to be motivated by
economic opportunities). In addition, firms that specifically explore Commercial Opportunities/Risks
associated with sustainability as indicated by their public disclosures would be more likely to adopt an
incentive scheme since they are structurally better positioned to understand and explore economic
opportunities linked to carbon emissions. We also include ‘Bonus Plan’ as a variable for economic
motives to adopt a certain incentive plan since whether a firm already has a performance-based bonus
plan for all employees reflects a firm’s belief in the effectiveness of monetary incentives, as well as the
difficulty of implementing an incentive plan for carbon emissions when a general bonus plan does not
exist. Moreover, we proxy for a firm’s institutional pressures for legitimacy that a firm may be facing
(e.g., mimetic pressures) by calculating the percentage of other firms in any given country-year pair that
have adopted monetary or nonmonetary incentives (% monetary incentives for the country-year and %
nonmonetary incentives for the country-year).
We control for firms’ ethical motives which will be perceived as prosocial by its employees in
several ways. First, we argue that if a focal firm has been an early (pre-2002) signatory of the UN Global
Compact (Join UN Global Compact by 2002), it did so based on ethical or institutional (rather than
economic) motives and therefore we include an indicator variable as a predictor for incentive scheme
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adoption. Second, we argue that firms that have adopted a range of corporate policies that characterize a
strong underlying sustainability culture (Eccles et. al., 2012) will also be more likely to adopt an incentive
scheme linked to carbon emissions. Therefore, we control for a corporate policy to Reduce carbon
emissions, to Reduce transportation emissions, and to Reduce supply chain emissions. Finally, firms that
have a Sustainability Committee or perform a Sustainability Audit and are therefore relatively more
transparent and credible with regards to their sustainability initiatives, thereby exhibiting a stronger
commitment towards this goal, will also be more likely to adopt incentive schemes linked to carbon
emissions.
Panel A of Table 8 presents the results of the first-stage multinomial logistic specification. In the
first-stage selection model, the probability of adopting a monetary (nonmonetary) incentive scheme is
positively and significantly associated with the percentage of other firms in any given country-year pair
that have adopted monetary (nonmonetary) incentives. The size of a firm, the existence of a sustainability
committee, a bonus plan, and a corporate policy of reducing carbon emissions, as well as whether the firm
is an early adopter of UN Global Compact, are all positively and significantly associated with the
adoption of a monetary incentive scheme. The adoption of both monetary and nonmonetary incentive
schemes is also positively and significantly related to the size of the firm and the existence of a bonus
plan. In addition, a firm that has assessed the commercial opportunities and risks associated with carbon
emissions is also more likely to adopt both incentive schemes.
Panel B of Table 8 presents the second stage results from an OLS regression where we control for
the estimated (from the first-stage) probability of adopting a specific type of incentive, in addition to
country, industry and year fixed effects. Second stage model:
Carbon emissionsi,t = α0 + α1 Salesi,t + β1Monetaryi,t + β2 Nonmonetaryi,t + β3 Both Monetary and
Nonmonetaryi,t + β4 Predicted Probability of Adopting a Certain Incentive Type (from first stage) + γ1
Corporate Policiesi,t + γ2 Business Case for Climate Change Actioni,t + γ3 Sustainability Governancei,t +
γ4 Other Control Variables Used in the First Stage + Country Fixed Effects + Industry Fixed Effects +
Year Fixed Effects
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In the second stage analysis, consistent with our previous results, we find that the exclusive
adoption of monetary incentives significantly increases carbon emissions, whereas we find directionally
consistent but insignificant results for nonmonetary incentives.15 We do note that the insignificance of the
coefficient on nonmonetary incentives is driven by an increase in the standard error rather than a decrease
in the size of the coefficient. The increase in the standard error is driven by the more onerous estimation
requirements of the multinomial logistic model. Moreover, we find no effect on carbon emissions by the
concurrent adoption of both monetary and nonmonetary incentives, suggesting a potential ‘cancel-out’ of
opposite effects from monetary and nonmonetary incentives. The coefficients on the control variables are
similar to those in the baseline regressions. Notice that the predicted probability of providing monetary
incentives (calculated from the first stage) is positively and significantly associated with carbon
emissions, indicating that there is a selection bias at least in the group that adopts monetary incentives
(i.e., those who have a higher probability of adopting monetary incentives also have higher carbon
emissions). Therefore, our additional tests to address those selection issues (through matching and twostage selection model) are worthwhile.
A discussion of the size of the estimated effect
Our analysis estimates the size of the effect from incentive provision on carbon emission levels to be in
the range of 10-15 percent positive for monetary incentives and in the same range but negative for
nonmonetary incentives. One could ask whether such estimates are too small, too large, or within the
boundaries of the actual experience of different companies. To be able to better answer this question we
examined the magnitude of carbon emission changes for several companies.
Alcatel-Lucent has been taking measures to reduce carbon emissions that involve its entire
workforce and the full range of its activities, from facility operations and logistics to IT and business

15

We estimated an alternative specification with exclusion restrictions where we excluded from the second stage the
variables that measure the % of monetary or nonmonetary incentives provided by companies in the same countryyear, membership in UN Global Compact in 2002, and employee bonus plan. These variables then function as
exclusion restrictions in our specification, i.e., they are determinants of the first stage choice, but not associated with
the level of carbon emissions in the second stage (as we find in Table 8). Results on the coefficients of interest were
identical to the ones reported in Table 8.
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travel. In 2011, the company reduced carbon emissions from its operations (Scopes 1 and 2) by 11
percent.16 Between 2008 and 2011, the company reduced its carbon footprint from operations by more
than 22 percent, which is nearly halfway to the company’s ultimate goal of 50 percent reduction by 2020.
Between 2002 and 2009 Xerox cut its emissions by 31 percent. This was achieved by reducing energy
consumption in its facilities, manufacturing operations, and across its service and sales vehicle fleet.17
Apple has concentrated on product design to reduce its carbon emissions. Apple supports that the
company design its products to use less material, ship with smaller packaging, and be as energy efficient
and recyclable as possible.18 As a result, Apple’s carbon emissions per dollar of revenue have decreased
by 15.4 percent between 2008 and 2011. Stonyfield reworked its distribution system to ship its products
more efficiently. Through these and other efforts, Stonyfield reduced its total annual carbon emissions by
more than 40 percent between 2006 and 2008 while growing its business.19 Taken together, these
examples demonstrate the actions employees can take to reduce carbon emissions and suggest that the
estimated impact of incentive provision on carbon emissions that we estimate in this study is well within
the boundaries of actual changes in carbon emissions experienced by companies in recent years.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we assess the effectiveness of different types of incentive schemes that corporations have
adopted to incentivize behavior by their employees towards reducing carbon emissions. Our results show
that the adoption of monetary incentives is associated with higher carbon emissions. In contrast, the
provision of nonmonetary incentives is associated with lower carbon emissions. These results hold in
cross-sectional analyses where we control for the size of the corporation, adoption of corporate policies to
reduce emissions, the presence of commercial risks and opportunities due to climate change, and the
quality of the organization’s sustainability governance. Moreover, we find the same result when we
introduce firm fixed effects and use in the identification only within-firm variation, or when we use a
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See http://www.alcatel-lucent.com/eco/reducing-co2/.
See http://www.xerox.com/about-xerox/environment/carbon-footprint/enus.html.
18
See http://www.apple.com/environment/.
19
See http://www.reliableplant.com/Read/20767/nh-yogurt-company-honored-for-reducing-co2-emissions.
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matched sample and track carbon emission intensity over time. Importantly, we also find support for our
results when we control for potential selection bias by explicitly accounting for the factors that may drive
the decision of an organization on whether or not to adopt any incentive system aimed at reducing carbon
emissions.
These results suggest that under some conditions (i.e., when employees perceive their action as
prosocial behavior) the adoption of nonmonetary incentives might be more effective in reducing carbon
emissions compared to monetary incentives. However, as in any non-laboratory analysis where the
treatment effect is non-randomly applied, it is difficult to identify the causal effect. While it is
conceivable that an unobservable factor exists that is positively correlated with monetary incentives,
negatively correlated with nonmonetary incentives, and positively correlated with carbon emissions, we
have not been able to identify such a factor. An alternative explanation is that reverse causality, at least
with respect to monetary incentives, is generating our findings. In other words, firms that provide
monetary incentives have higher carbon emissions. The analysis where we introduce firm fixed-effects
partially addresses this concern and suggests that holding the firm constant, after the introduction of
monetary incentives, carbon emissions increase. Moreover, the two-stage multinomial logistic model that
we present yields results consistent with our initial analyses and suggests that the selection bias cannot
alone explain our results. A slightly different alternative explanation that introduces more complexity is
that firms that have higher carbon emissions and that expect their carbon emissions to increase in the
future years provide monetary incentives. We partially address this concern with our matched sample
analysis by matching on any pre-existing trends in carbon emission intensity and we find consistent
results.
We recognize a number of other caveats related to our work. Our sample is predominantly
comprised of large multinational organizations. It is possible that the effects documented here do not
generalize to smaller firms that are competing only locally. Maybe the composition of the employee
workforce holds different motivation for reducing carbon emissions. Moreover, we have been able to
examine only four years of data. It could well be that analyzing data over a longer time horizon may
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produce somewhat different results if there is a time lag between the introduction of incentive systems
and their eventual effect. For example, monetary incentives might be effective at motivating behavior to
reduce carbon emissions in the long-run. Importantly, our results suggest that monetary incentives appear
ineffective conditional on the power of the provided incentives. It is possible that if a company increases
the power of these incentives (i.e., larger monetary payouts), then monetary incentives might lead to
lower carbon emissions. In addition, the data we analyze pertain to the ex-ante incentive structures put in
place by a firm. We are unable to observe the ex-post incentive payout limiting our ability to understand
whether and under what conditions these incentives are paid. We believe that all of these issues are
fruitful areas for future research.
Still, this study raises an important practical question: what is the best way for a firm to
communicate the voluntary adoption of a carbon reduction program and its related incentives? The
economically instrumental argument is most palatable to investors and begs for a matching incentive
scheme in order to be perceived as ‘real’ rather than ‘greenwashing.’ This is evident in the tone of the
annual reports prepared by CDP and PricewaterhouseCoopers where the provision of monetary incentives
is seen as ‘progress towards addressing climate change.’ Ironically, though, the associated monetary
incentives may actually be counterproductive except for those employees whose formal job
responsibilities are directly focused on energy efficiency and the reduction of carbon emissions.

26

References
Aguilera, R.V., Rupp, D.E., Williams, C.A., and Ganapathi, J. 2007. Putting the S back in corporate
social responsibility: A multilevel theory of social change in organizations. Academy of Management
Review, 32: 836–863.
Banker, R. and S. Datar 1989. Sensitivity, Precision, and Linear Aggregation of Signals for Performance
Evaluation. Journal of Accounting Research, 27 (1): 21-39.
Banker, R., G. Potter and D. Srinivasan. 2000. An Empirical Investigation of an Incentive Plan That
Includes Nonfinancial Performance Measures. The Accounting Review 75 (1): 65-92.
Bansal, P. and Roth, K. 2000. Why Companies Go Green: A Model of Ecological Responsiveness,
Academy of Management Journal 43: 717–736.
Bénabou, R. and J. Tirole. 2006. Incentives and Prosocial Behavior. The American Economic Review 96
(5): 1652-1678.
Bhattacharya, C.B. and S. Sen. 2004. Doing Better at Doing Good. California Management Review, 47
(1): 9-24.
Bonner, S. E., R. Hastie, G. B. Sprinkle, and S. M. Young 2000. A review of the effects of financial
incentives on performance by laboratory tasks: Implications for management accounting. Journal of
Management Accounting Research 12(1): 19–64.
Brønn, P.S. and D. Vidaver-Cohen. 2009. Corporate Motives for Social Initiative: Legitimacy,
Sustainability, or the Bottom Line? Journal of Business Ethics, 87 (1): 91-109.
Bushman, R., R. Indjejikian and A. Smith. 1995. Aggregate Performance Measures in Business Unit
Manager Compensation: The Role of Intrafirm Interdependencies, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol.
33 Supplement: 101-128.
Cheng, B., I., Ioannou, G., Serafeim. 2011. Corporate Social Responsibility and Access to Finance.
Strategic Management Journal, forthcoming.
Deci, E., Koestner, R. and R. Ryan 1999. A Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments Examining the Effects
of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation. Psychological Bulletin, 125 (6): 627-668.
Frey, B. and F. Oberholzer-Gee 1997. The Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical Analysis of Motivation
Crowding-out. The American Economic Review, 87 (4): 746-755.
Gibbons, R. 1998. Incentives in Organizations. NBER Working Paper Series.
Gneezy, U. and A. Rustichini 2000a. A Fine is a Price. Journal of Legal Studies, vol. XXIX.
Gneezy, U. and A. Rustichini 2000b. Pay Enough or Don’t Pay At All. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 115 (3): 791-810.
Holmstrom, B. 1979. Moral Hazard and Observability. The Bell Journal of Economics, 10 (1): 74-91

27

Holmstrom, B. and P. Milgrom 1991. Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset
Ownership, and Job Design. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 7: 24-52.
Kunreuther, H., Easterling D., Desvousges, W. and P. Slovic 1990. Public Attitudes Toward Siting a High
Level Nuclear Waste Depository in Nevada. Risk Analysis, 10: 469-484.
Lazear, E.P. 1999. Personnel economics: past lessons and future directions. Journal of Labor Economics
17(2): 199-236.
Lepper, M. R., Greene, D., and R. E. Nisbett. 1973. Undermining children's intrinsic interest with
extrinsic reward: A test of the ‘overjustification’ hypothesis. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 28(1): 129-137.
Massa, L. 2012. Achieving superior sustainability performance: Instrumentality, legitimacy, ethics and
slack resources. IESE Business School, Working Paper.
Potters, J., Sefton, M., and L. Vesterlund. 2007. Leading-by-example and signaling in voluntary
contribution games: an experimental study. Economic Theory, 33(1): 169-182.
Prendergast, C. 1999. The Provision of Incentives in Firms. Journal of Economic Literature, 37 (1): 7-63
Sharma S. and Starik M., 2002 Research in corporate sustainability, Northampton, Massachusetts:
Edward Elgar Publishing.
Skinner, B. F. 1953. Science and human behavior. New York: Macmillan.
Stern, N. 2007. Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change. Cambridge University Press.
Turban, D. B. and D. W. Greening. 1997. Corporate social performance and organizational attractiveness.
Academy of Management Journal, 40: 658–672.

28

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Variable Definitions
Variable
Carbon emissions
Carbon emissions scaled by
sales
Monetary
Nonmonetary
Sales
Employees
Assets
Reduce carbon emissions
Sustainability committee
Commercial
opportunities/risks
Reduce transportation
emissions
Reduce supply chain emissions
Sustainability audit
Environmental positions

Variable Definition
Natural logarithm of carbon emissions
(scope 1 and 2 as measured in tons)
Natural logarithm of carbon emissions
(scope 1 and 2 as measured in tons) over sales
An indicator variable that equals to 1 if the firm provides
monetary incentives in that year
An indicator variable that equals to 1 if the firm provides
nonmonetary incentives in that year
Natural logarithm of sales
(measured in million USDs)
Natural logarithm of number of employees
Natural logarithm of assets
(measured in million USDs)
An indicator variable that equals to 1 if the firm has a policy
to reduce carbon emissions
An indicator variable that equals to 1 if the firm has a
sustainability committee on the board
An indicator variable that equals to 1 if the firm has assessed
commercial opportunities/risks related to climate change
An indicator variable that equals to 1 if the firm has a policy
to reduce carbon emissions related to transportation
An indicator variable that equals to 1 if the firm has a policy
to reduce carbon emissions from its supply chain
An indicator variable that equals to 1 if the firm has its
sustainability performance measures externally audited
An indicator variable that equals to 1 if the firm provides
incentives to employees in positions responsible for
environmental performance.
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Observations

Mean

Std. Dev.

1,683

13.258

2.387

1,683

4.196

2.040

1,683

0.421

0.494

1,683

0.185

0.388

1,683

9.062

1.449

1,602

9.945

1.525

1,683

9.692

1.661

1,683

0.596

0.491

1,683

0.704

0.457

1,683

0.647

0.478

1,683

0.694

0.461

1,683

0.720

0.449

1,683

0.473

0.499

1,659

0.269

0.443

Table 2: Correlation Matrix
I

II

III

IV

V

VI

VII

VIII

IX

X

XI

XII

XIII

Carbon emissions

1.000

Carbon emissions scaled by
sales

0.806

1.000

Monetary

0.187

0.102

1.000

Nonmonetary

0.038

-0.018

0.287

1.000

Sales

0.529

-0.076

0.168

0.089

1.000

Employees

0.432

-0.072

0.150

0.084

0.831

1.000

Assets

0.323

-0.181

0.149

0.067

0.803

0.568

1.000

Reduce carbon emissions

0.374

0.291

0.175

0.108

0.213

0.158

0.079

1.000

Sustainability committee

0.168

0.076

0.238

0.142

0.175

0.143

0.186

0.168

1.000

Commercial opportunities/risks

0.152

0.067

0.117

0.007

0.159

0.125

0.185

0.110

0.149

1.000

Reduce transportation
emissions

-0.059

-0.180

0.105

0.103

0.159

0.181

0.111

0.225

0.123

0.053

1.000

Reduce supply chain emissions

0.053

-0.087

0.196

0.107

0.213

0.217

0.174

0.278

0.234

0.153

0.305

1.000

Sustainability audit

0.169

0.071

0.174

0.081

0.184

0.135

0.205

0.184

0.201

0.137

0.098

0.215

1.000

Environmental positions

0.082

-0.011

0.547

0.336

0.154

0.151

0.176

0.122

0.163

0.128

0.113

0.155

0.104
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XIV

1.000

Table 3: Incentives and Carbon Emissions
Dependent variable

Carbon emissions
(2)
Coefficient
t-stat.

(3)
Coefficient

t-stat.

2.72a
-1.88c

0.178
-0.142

2.87a
-1.93c

0.964

26.23a

0.242
0.467
0.369

2.29b
4.63a
4.90a

Corporate Policies
Reduce carbon emissions
Reduce transportation emissions
Reduce supply chain emissions

0.345
-0.171
-0.176

3.68a
-1.87c
-2.07b

0.291
-0.165
-0.190

3.01a
-1.76c
-2.35b

Business case for climate change action
Commercial opportunities/risks

0.076

1.11

0.044

0.66

Sustainability Governance
Sustainability committee
Sustainability audit
Intercept

5.839

0.134
0.267
5.813

1.62
3.48a
12.07

0.081
0.236
4.010

1.08
3.17a
7.46

Country fixed effects
Industry fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Adj R-squared
N

Yes
Yes
Yes
83.3%
1,683

Incentives
Monetary
Nonmonetary
Scale
Sales
Employees
Assets

(1)
Coefficient

t-stat.

0.215
-0.141

3.08a
-1.76c

0.178
-0.146

1.004

31.14a

11.61

Yes
Yes
Yes
84.0%
1,683

Yes
Yes
Yes
85.7%
1,602

(1): OLS regression using Sales as a proxy for scale; (2): OLS regression controlling for corporate policies, business
case for climate change action, and sustainability governance; (3) OLS regression using number of employees
(Employees) and Assets as additional proxies for scale. All OLS regressions control for country fixed effects,
industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of carbon emissions.
a. p<0.01; b. p<0.05; c. p<0.10
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Table 4: Incentives and Carbon Emissions – Robustness tests
Dependent variable

Incentives
Monetary
Nonmonetary

Carbon emissions/sales
Carbon emissions
(1)
(2)
Coefficient
t-stat. Coefficient
t-stat.
2.59a
-1.99b

0.169
-0.154

Scale
Sales
Employees
Assets

Carbon emissions
(3)
Coefficient
t-stat.

0.131
-0.136

1.99b
-1.97b

0.185
-0.107

2.63a
-1.21

0.083
0.563
0.397

0.81
7.07a
4.74a

0.284
0.442
0.345

2.56b
4.19a
4.28a

Corporate Policies
Reduce carbon emissions
Reduce transportation emissions
Reduce supply chain emissions

0.338
-0.173
-0.191

3.66a
-1.88c
-2.36b

0.197
-0.148
-0.158

2.43b
-1.67c
-1.87c

0.338
-0.173
-0.182

3.14a
-1.65c
-2.00b

Business case for climate change action
Commercial opportunities/risks

0.070

1.03

0.040

0.60

0.062

0.83

Sustainability Governance
Sustainability committee
Sustainability audit
Intercept

0.122
0.253
5.578

1.51
3.34a
12.88

0.075
0.264
4.083

0.97
3.44a
8.28

0.102
0.233
3.811

1.21
2.82a
6.30

Country fixed effects
Industry fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Subsector fixed effects
Country-year fixed effects
Industry-year fixed effects
Adj R-squared
N

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No

Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No

No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes

78.1%
1,683

86.3%
1,602

84.6%
1,602

(1): OLS regression using the natural logarithm of carbon emissions scaled by sales as the dependent variable; (2)
OLS regression using the natural logarithm of carbon emissions as the dependent variable and controlling for
subsector fixed effects by using a finer classification of industry; (3) OLS regression using the natural logarithm of
carbon emissions as the dependent variable and controlling for country-year fixed effects and industry-year fixed
effects.
a. p<0.01; b. p<0.05; c. p<0.10
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Table 5: Incentives and Carbon Emissions – Within-firm Estimates
Dependent variable

Carbon emissions
(1)
Coefficient
t-stat.

Incentives
Monetary
Nonmonetary

0.071
-0.099

1.64
-1.39

Scale
Sales

0.117

0.83

Corporate Policies
Reduce carbon emissions
Reduce transportation emissions
Reduce supply chain emissions

0.042
-0.122
0.079

Business case for climate change action
Commercial opportunities/risks
Sustainability Governance
Sustainability committee
Sustainability audit
Firm fixed effects
Country-year fixed effects
Industry-year fixed effects
Adj R-squared
N

Carbon emissions/sales
(2)
Coefficient
t-stat.
0.113
-0.128

2.29a
-1.57

0.43
-1.17
1.10

0.060
-0.089
0.096

0.58
-0.77
1.30

0.091

0.76

0.149

1.18

0.000
0.187

0.00
1.47

-0.018
0.193

-0.25
1.33

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

97.8%
906

98.6%
906

(1): OLS regression using the natural logarithm of carbon emissions as the dependent variable and controlling for
firm fixed effects; (2): OLS regression using the natural logarithm of carbon emissions scaled by sales as the
dependent variable and controlling for firm fixed effects.
a. p<0.01; b. p<0.05; c. p<0.10
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Table 6: Incentives and Carbon Emissions Scaled by Sales – Matched Sample
Panel A: Effect in year t
Diff=Treatment-Control

p-value

t-1

0.021

0.676

t

0.143

0.028

Diff-in-diffs

0.122

0.046b

Diff=Treatment-Control

p-value

t-1

-0.080

0.504

t+1

0.355

0.057

Diff-in-diffs

0.435

0.049b

Panel B: Effect in year t+1

Panel A shows the differences in the natural logarithm of carbon emissions scaled by sales in year t-1 and year t
between the treatment group and its matched sample of control units (matched by exact industry and the closest
values of carbon emissions scaled by sales in year t-1).
Panel B shows the differences in the natural logarithm of carbon emissions scaled by sales in year t-1 and year t+1
between the treatment group and its matched sample of control units (matched by exact industry and the closest
values of carbon emissions scaled by sales in year t-1).
a. p<0.01; b. p<0.05; c. p<0.10
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Table 7: Incentives and Carbon Emissions – Employee Type
Dependent variable

Carbon emissions
(1)
Coefficient
t-stat.

Carbon emissions/sales
(2)
Coefficient
t-stat.

Incentives
0.288

3.50a

0.278

3.39a

Nonmonetary

-0.223

-2.12

a

-0.227

-2.18a

Environmental Position

0.243

1.94c

0.231

1.86c

Monetary * Environmental Position

-0.393

-2.78a

-0.385

-2.74a

Nonmonetary * Environmental Position

0.101

0.76

0.098

0.74

Scale
Sales

0.961

26.05a

Corporate Policies
Reduce carbon emissions

0.355

3.75a

0.347

3.73a

-0.174

-1.90c

-0.176

-1.92c

-0.181

-2.14

b

-0.196

-2.42b

Business case for climate change action
Commercial opportunities/risks

0.093

1.35

0.087

1.28

Sustainability Governance
Sustainability committee

0.129

1.55

0.116

1.43

0.267

3.47

a

0.252

3.31a

5.771

11.63

5.521

12.27

Monetary

Reduce transportation emissions
Reduce supply chain emissions

Sustainability audit
Intercept
Country fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Industry fixed effects
Year fixed effects

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Adj R-squared

84.1%

78.3%

N

1,659

1,659

(1): OLS regression using the natural logarithm of carbon emissions as the dependent variable, with interaction
terms between the type of incentives (Monetary or Nonmonetary) and Environmental Position; (2): OLS regression
using the natural logarithm of carbon emissions scaled by sales as the dependent variable, with interaction terms
between the type of incentives (Monetary or Nonmonetary) and Environmental Position.
a. p<0.01; b. p<0.05; c. p<0.10
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Table 8: Panel A – First-stage, Multinomial Logistic Regression
Firm Motives

Coefficient
(base outcome)

t-stat.

Economic/Institutional
Economic
Economic
Institutional
Institutional
Ethical
Institutional/Ethical
Institutional/Ethical
All three
All three
All three

-0.014
0.105
0.280
0.020
9.788
0.523
0.286
0.010
0.472
0.064
-0.297
-5.465

-0.13
0.36
0.93
0.02
10.91a
0.70
0.86
0.04
1.56
0.20
-0.87
-5.03

Economic/Institutional
Economic
Economic
Institutional
Institutional
Ethical
Institutional/Ethical
Institutional/Ethical
All three
All three
All three

0.103
0.173
0.522
5.552
-0.708
0.881
0.568
0.194
0.515
-0.160
0.091
-5.103

1.72c
1.05
2.93a
12.36a
-1.47
2.60a
3.02a
1.19
3.04a
-0.90
0.45
-8.99

Economic/Institutional
Economic
Economic
Institutional
Institutional
Ethical
Institutional/Ethical
Institutional/Ethical
All three
All three
All three

0.268
0.594
0.714
5.646
6.371
-0.059
0.399
0.157
0.268
-0.006
0.389
-9.997
0.2626
1,683

3.01a
2.50b
2.87a
7.54a
10.08a
-0.11
1.30
0.72
1.14
-0.02
1.26
-10.25

Incentive Type
No Incentive
Only Nonmonetary
Sales
Commercial Opportunities/Risks
Bonus Plan
% monetary incentives for the country-year
% nonmonetary incentives for the country-year
Join UN Global Compact by 2002
Sustainability Committee
Sustainability audit
Reduce carbon emissions
Reduce transportation emissions
Reduce supply chain emissions
Intercept
Only Monetary
Sales
Commercial Opportunities/Risks
Bonus Plan
% monetary incentives for the country-year
% nonmonetary incentives for the country-year
Join UN Global Compact by 2002
Sustainability Committee
Sustainability audit
Reduce carbon emissions
Reduce transportation emissions
Reduce supply chain emissions
Intercept
Both Monetary and Nonmonetary
Sales
Commercial Opportunities/Risks
Bonus Plan
% monetary incentives for the country-year
% nonmonetary incentives for the country-year
Join UN Global Compact by 2002
Sustainability Committee
Sustainability audit
Reduce carbon emissions
Reduce transportation emissions
Reduce supply chain emissions
Intercept
Pseudo R-squared
N
a. p<0.01; b. p<0.05; c. p<0.10
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Table 8: Panel B – Second Step, OLS estimation controlling for the predicted probabilities of adopting a
particular incentive scheme (first stage)
Dependent variable

Carbon emissions
Coefficient

t-stat

Only Nonmonetary

-0.188

-1.40

Only Monetary

0.139

1.88c

Both Monetary and Nonmonetary

0.029

0.28

Predicted Prob. of Providing Only Nonmonetary

-0.728

-1.07

Predicted Prob. of Providing Only Monetary

0.729

1.73c

Predicted Prob. of Providing Both Incentives

0.438

0.94

Sales

0.938

22.14a

Sustainability Committee

0.080

0.91

Commercial Opportunities/Risks

0.049

0.70

% monetary incentives for the country-year

-0.556

-1.22

% nonmonetary incentives for the country-year

0.335

0.57

Bonus plan

-0.028

-0.31

Join UN Global Compact by 2002

0.013

0.09

Reduce carbon emissions

0.301

3.19a

Reduce Transportation emissions

-0.151

-1.63

Reduce supply chain emissions
Sustainability Audit

-0.210
0.237

-2.46b
3.06a

Intercept

6.177

15.51

Country Fixed Effects

Yes

Industry Fixed Effects

Yes

Year Fixed Effects

Yes

Adj R-Squared

85.11%

N

1,683

OLS regression using the natural logarithm of carbon emissions as the dependent variable, country fixed effects,
industry fixed effects, year fixed effects and controlling for the predicted probabilities of adopting a particular
incentive scheme. All standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
a. p<0.01; b. p<0.05; c. p<0.10
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Appendix I – Investor CDP Survey Sample Compositions
Country

Association for Sustainable and
Asia (ex-Japan)

Sample size

Office

Responsible Investment in Asia
(ASrIA) - Partner to CDP

Australia and

Investor Group on Climate Change

New Zealand

(IGCC) - Partners to CDP

(The largest companies, as measured by market capitalization)
170 largest Asian companies (excluding Japan, China, India &
Korea) - Hong Kong (75), Taiwan (25 companies), Malaysia (15),
Singapore (23), Indonesia (10 ), Thailand (10), Philippines (10), and
China (2
ASX 200 / NZX 50

Belgium,
Netherlands,

CDP Germany

Benelux 150

Luxembourg
CDP Brazil / Latin America together
with the Brazilian Association of
Brazil

Pension Funds (ABRAPP), Fábrica
Éthica Brasil and BANCO REAL –

80 largest companies in Brazil listed on the BOVESPA São Paolo
Stock Exchange

Partners to CDP
Canada

CDP North America

Central &

Iparfejlesztési Közalapítvány (IFKA –

Eastern Europe

Public Foundation for the Progress of

(CEE)

the Industry) - Partner to CDP

China

Local Agent: SynTao

Canada 200
CEE 100 largest companies in CEE - Poland (56), Hungary (9),
Slovenia (8), Czech Republic (6), Slovakia (4), Lithuania (4),
Romania (3), Austria (2), Netherlands (2), (Serbia (1), Croatia (1),
UK (1), Estonia (2) and USA (1)
China 100
FTSEurofirst 300 Eurozone: 300 largest companies in Europe - UK
(62), France (52), Germany (35), Switzerland (27), Spain (20),

Europe

Europe

Sweden (19), Italy (18), Netherlands (14), Belgium (10 ), Norway
(7), Austria (6), Denmark (6 ), Finland (6), Portugal (5), Ireland (4),
Luxembourg (4), Greece (2), Australia (1), Mexico (1) and the USA
(1)

France
Germany and
Austria
Global CDP
India

CDP France

SBF 250

CDP Germany

Germany and Austria 250

UK and USA offices
Confederation of Indian Industry (CII

Global 500: Top 500 companies within the FTSE Global Equity
Index Series
India 200
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CESD), and WWF India - Partners to
CDP
CDP Southern Europe together with
Iberia 125

ECODES and BBVA - Partners to
CDP

Ireland

CDP Ireland

Spain 85: largest companies within IBEX 35 and FTSE Spain All
Cap Index and Portugal 40
Ireland 40

CDPSouthern Europe, together with
Italy

Accenture, Banca Monte Paschi di
Sienna and the Kyoto Club - Partners

Italy 100

to CDP
Japan

CDP Japan

Japan 500

CDP Brazil / Latin America together
Latin America

with the Brazilian Institute of Investor

Latin America 50: 50 largest companies in Latin America - Brazil

Relations (IBRI) and Fábrica Éthica

(16), Mexico (14 ), Chile (13), Peru (5) and Argentina (2)

Brasil - Partner to CDP
Korean Sustainability Investing Forum
Korea

(KoSIF) and Eco-Frontier - Partners to

KRX 200: Korea Exchange 200 Index

CDP
CDP Nordic, together with ATP and
Nordic Region

KLP Asset Management - Partners to
CDP

Russia
South Africa

CDP London
National Business Initiative (NBI) Partner to CDP
CDP Germany, together with Ethos

Switzerland

and Pictet Asset Management Partners to CDP

Turkey

Sabanci University Corporate
Governance Forum –Partners to CDP

Nordic 260: 260 largest companies in Nordic region - Sweden (90),
Norway (65), Denmark (44), Finland (48), Bermuda (3), UK (3),
and Canada (2), Cyprus (1), Iceland (1), Belgium (1), Malta (1),
USA (1)
RTS Index 50: 50 largest companies in Russia
FTSE/JSE 100

Switzerland 100: 100 of the largest companies (SPI Large & Mid
Cap (SOCI))

ISE 100: 100 of the largest companies

UK

CDP UK

FTSE 350

USA

CDP North America

S&P 500

Electric Utilities CDP UK and International Partners
Transport

CDP UK and International Partners

250 of the largest Electric Utilities companies globally
100 of the largest Transport companies globally
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Appendix II – Investor CDP Survey Sample Answers
The following 2009 sample answers provide a glimpse into what firms mean by monetary incentives or
nonmonetary incentives when they answer the question.
Monetary incentives:
…At a lower management level relevant managers' performance targets are related to the climate change
program objectives and personal bonuses are influenced by the progress in achieving the goals. A senior
manager owns the GHG target…
…Allianz managers that are in charge of climate change products and services have their incentives
related to monetary rewards. Allianz Group is furthermore considering the introduction of a monetary
incentive scheme for individual Allianz operating entities and executives that are responsible for the
reduction of GHG emissions in line with our Group Climate Strategy. Such a bonus related incentive is
already in place at Allianz Germany for respective managers implementing carbon emission reduction
measures…

…BG Group operates a cash-based Annual Incentive Scheme (AIS) for its employees. The performance
of both the company and the individual combine to determine the value of the award paid under the AIS.
The GHG reductions targets form part of the scorecard for the group (which covers all employees) against
which performance is evaluated…

Nonmonetary incentives:
…ConAgra Foods recognizes project teams for outstanding projects related to ‘Climate Change and
Energy Efficiency’ (as well as four other categories related to sustainability performance) through our
internal Sustainable Development Awards program. Team members from the five project finalists in each
category are invited to Omaha for an awards event and conference. Project teams recognized with a
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Sustainable Development Award are given $5,000 to donate to an environmental nonprofit in their local
community…

…Through the ISO14001 certification process, Air France - KLM is involving each employee in order to
inform him about company's environmental policy and to stimulate him to participate actively into the Air
France - KLM commitments, which includes climate change issues…

…Campbell has several employee recognition programs that can and have been used to provide
incentives for management of GHG targets. The Company’s most prestigious global recognition, the
Campbell Extraordinary Performance Awards has a specific Sustainability Category and both of last
year’s winners in that category included projects with measurable impacts on GHG targets…
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